

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 730120



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS









Week Ending January 20, 1973

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For the President Only

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SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1973
Weekly average for each monthOCTOBER 1972 — JANUARY 1973
Weekly data as reported**US BATTLE DEATHS** increased to four from the two reported last week.**SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS** totaled 319 for the week. This figure is preliminary and may change considerably as more complete information becomes available.**INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE** include seven regular, one "gap fill," and six special purpose groups totaling 4,257 personnel. The estimate of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam and Cambodia since 1 October 1972 now stands at some 43,000 - 45,000.**ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS** rose to 502 from last week's 489.**ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION** declined to 1,644 from the 1,757 of last week.**SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS** as measured by the percentage of enemy killed in ground combat by GVN forces remained at 100%.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

In most areas of South Vietnam, enemy-initiated activity remained at a low level during the past week, although sharp contacts occurred near the Michelin Plantation in MR 3 and near Vi Thanh, the capital of Chuong Thien Province in MR 4. The North Vietnamese are still offering stubborn resistance to the GVN push toward the Cua Viet River north of Quang Tri City and friendly forces have made only limited progress in this area in recent days. There is mounting evidence from a wide range of sources that the Communists will attempt to launch a countrywide land-grabbing effort in the days between the initialing and the signing of a cease-fire agreement. South Vietnamese forces are well aware of these enemy plans and are on full alert. Several recent reports also indicate that the Communists may attempt to overrun Phan Thiet, the capital of Binh Thuan Province in MR 2, and declare that city as the seat of the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG). According to these reports, a new NVA regiment is being infiltrated into the Phan Thiet area, but we have no information confirming such a military movement.

Enemy activity in Cambodia during the past week was modest in scope but seems to have been designed to keep the Cambodian forces on the defensive in widely scattered areas of the country. The enemy's two-week old siege of Romeas, some 30 miles northwest of Phnom Penh, was finally broken by a FANK relief column on 23 January. South of Phnom Penh, FANK efforts to clear Route 2 have met with mixed results. The siege of Svay Prey, some 33 miles south of Phnom Penh on this highway, was broken by FANK paratroopers moving north from Takeo. On the other hand, a government relief column pushing southward on Route 2 to relieve Thnal Totung, 27 miles south of Phnom Penh, was stalled and awaiting reinforcements. During the week, Cambodian forces also finished clearing a sector of the lower Mekong River, and river convoys to Phnom Penh are moving again. Disruptions to either highways or waterways could occur again, however, with little warning. Moreover, intercepted communications indicate that the Khmer Communists are attempting to reinforce their units on the outskirts of the Phnom Penh area and may try to increase harassments against that city.

In northern Laos, ambush and shelling activity continued along Route 13, which links Vientiane with the Royal Capital at Luang Prabang. To the east, two irregular battalions, airlifted into the Muong Soui area in an effort to recapture that former neutralist headquarters, withdrew to their original infiltration points after encountering stronger enemy opposition than expected. In south Laos, government reinforcements in the Muong Phalane sector have also met heavy enemy resistance. A prisoner has reported that a second North Vietnamese regiment arrived earlier this month in the Muong Phalane area to reinforce the one enemy regiment already there against the current campaign of the friendly irregulars. Further to the south, elements of three irregular mobile groups moving slowly back toward Saravane (which was retaken by the Communists on 9 January) have been meeting light to moderate enemy resistance.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

During the week, about 4,300 new NVA personnel were accepted into the estimate of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam and Cambodia, raising the total since 1 October 1972 to some 43,000 - 45,000. Recent evidence indicates that since November, the majority of the regular infiltration groups (34 out of a total of 59 groups) destined for MR 5, COSVN, and the B-3 Front may have contained personnel for anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) or artillery units. This is in contrast to previous infiltration activity to those areas, which consisted primarily of regular infantry replacement groups. Along with the previously reported movement of 200-240 armored vehicles, this infiltration pattern suggests a larger deployment of heavy weaponry to the central and southern parts of South Vietnam than occurred in last year's dry season. The enemy's intention is probably to get as much heavy equipment as possible into South Vietnam prior to a cease-fire.

There is other evidence of continuing large-scale logistics activity as well. During December and early January, some 20,000 tons -- about 40 percent of it ordnance -- were identified moving through the central North Vietnam Panhandle. Furthermore, intercepted messages indicate that a concerted transportation "offensive" to move large quantities of ammunition, arms, and explosives between 15 and 27 January is underway within North Vietnam. Transportation elements in the Lao Panhandle are likewise involved in an "urgent transportation phase" which is to last from 7 to 25 January and is to move large amounts of materiel "to the front." Much of this materiel is doubtless needed to replace stocks lost in the course of the Communist offensive of 1972. Some of it, however, is almost certainly intended to increase the Communists' stocks of in-country equipment and supplies before the level is frozen in connection with a cease-fire.

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